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Corporate control has added value for an investor since it gives degrees of freedom about the use of
assets, sources of finance, salaries, etc. On the other hand, real options create value through the flexibility
associated to the ability to react to some relevant uncertainty. The process of acquisition of corporate
control can have two real options associated, a waiting option and a growth option. In the waiting option
value is created through sequential investment instead of investing at once, while the growth option
carries all the private benefits the investor can seize from control by making follow up investments, which
can also justify premiums paid above the former market price. A relevant proposition of our paper is that
the exercise price of the growth option (and hence the amount to be paid as the control premium) can be
affected by the release of information. We develop a model for these two theoretical extremes, one where
the exercise price fully reacts to events, and one where the exercise price does not react at all, and we
obtain that the timing of the process of acquiring control would depend on the reaction of the price to be
paid to obtain control, so would the size of the control premium over the former price.
Fields : G13, G31, G34.1
1. Introduction
The literature of real options starts with the papers of Myers (1977), Mac Donald and Siegel
(1984, 1985,1986), Dixit and Pyndick (1995). This literature explores the analogy between
financial options (calls and puts) and the flexibility every individual or investor has in the real
world to respond to changing conditions of the business environment, taking advantage of the
favorable states of the nature, and avoiding the losses of unfavorable states.
The basic real options described in the literature are the waiting option and the growth option
(both similar to a "call" or a right to purchase) and the abandonment option (similar to a "put" or
a right to sell). In this work we shall make use of the waiting and growth options associated to
tender offers and acquisitions processes.
1.1 Waiting option
The waiting option reflects the potential flexibility to wait before taking a decision, getting access
to new and better information and be in a better position to decide when circumstances make
worth do it. This means that in a very uncertain environment the action of sinking investment all
at once will be like making a bet. If the investor can wait and access to better information, she
would always be in better position to improve the bet and avoid bad states of the nature, while
taking advantage of good ones (the options to invest is kept "alive" because is more valuable than
exercised).
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The call gives its holder the right to purchase an underlying asset of current value V by paying
the exercise price I previously agreed. In the real options world, to make an investment is similar
to exercise a call option, where the underlying asset is the current value of the future cashflows to
be captured, and the cost of acquiring these cashflows is the amount I to be invested (exercise
price). When deciding to invest or not, the investor is also deciding whether to kill or not her
waiting option, so everytime someone invests is killing a waiting option. If the investor could
wait to see how the random variables associated with the future payoffs turn on, would always be
better off by keeping the option alive. However, it might be the case that keeping the option alive
(not investing) carries on potential costs given by, for example, the entrance of another
competitor seeking for the same cashflows, that in turn acts to reduce the value of the underlying
asset (the cashflows now have to be divided between more participants). In this case the decision
of investing may be the best way of locking the opportunity up, as a consequence of the trade off
between the benefits of waiting and the costs associated to it.
1.2 Growth Option
Another real option depicted in the literature is the growth option (or the right to make follow up
investments when states of the nature are favorable to the investor). In this real option, the
investor reacts to good states of the nature by scaling up investments. Follow up investment gives
the investor the possibility of capitalizing on the good states of the nature.
In the same tense as with the waiting option, the analogy with financial options comes associated
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In this cases, the investor or entrepreneurs exercises the right to buy new cashflows associated to
scaling up former investment (which is similar to paying an exercise price), which lets her
capture more value when things turn out favorable, and avoiding investing further when states of
the nature are unfavorable to the project. It can be easily seen that follow up investments are
contingent on good states of the nature, and the investor has the right but not the obligation to
invest (which in turn means she would not invest when nature does not show well for the
decision).
Now we will see how these options are related to a learning process. If the investor or
entrepreneur
1 could wait before undertaking an investment (e.g. there are no significant costs
from waiting), she would "learn" about the true nature of the underlying asset and its associated
cashflows.
1.3 Real Options and the Learning Process
There is a considerable amount of literature about the effects of the learning process. Arrow
(1962) has one of the former works about the economic implications of "learning by doing". In
Jovanovic and Mac Donald (1994a) firms improve their experience through innovation. There are
also numerous works that explore the learning process through experimentation (Grossman et. al.
1977, Rob 1991, étc.). More recently, Bernardo and Chowdry (2002) explore the learning process
by the firm about its own skills using a real options approach.  It is our objective to apply the
methodology of some sort of learning process in the context of real options to the process of
gaining corporate control of a firm (through a takeover or acquisition).
The corporate control allows the main shareholder to define the orientation of the business giving
her some discretion over business decisions (use of assets and other perquisites) in the context of
respecting the rights of minority shareholders. An entrepreneur or investor may seek corporate
control of a firm when it has a vision that the assets will be of much more value under her
management. “Her management” conveys some sort of power over decisions like the use and
disposal of assets, the use of resources, the types of products and services provided by the firm,
etc. As we have mentioned before, a real option will always be associated to assets and resources
that provide flexibility to react to the changing nature of business
2.
The entrepreneur or investor seeking control of a firm has an idea (not complete) about the
cashflows generated by this firm (has "imperfect" information), and wants to learn more about the
                                                          
1 In the remaining I shall use the terms investor or entrepreneur interchangeable.
2 An analysis of property rights and real options, can be found in Dapena 20024
true nature of these cashflows
3. She also has an estimate of the value that can be created based on
the current state of business and the improvements she can make; this is in many cases the
foundation of the premium she is willing to pay above the market price. However, there will
generally be situations where the investor could benefit from learning more about the firm,
having a more accurate picture of its true nature and hence of the value to be created. Therefore
by waiting or investing sequentially the investor can get access to more information about the
firm before committing a large investment on a controlling stake. Thus, the investor can invest in
a stock of shares that gives her a seat in the Board of Directors, which brings access to a different
kind of information. Then she can decide whether is worth to make a large investment and gain
corporate control of the firm, now with more information backing the decision and hence
reducing the risk of an error of judgement.
2. The Value of Corporate Control
The possibility of deciding about the destiny of a firm, having power to transform opinions into
courses of actions, and controlling and getting access to the flow of private information, has a
value widely recognized in the market. This value is commonly known as the control premium
and it is equal to the difference in value of a share belonging to a majority shareholder with
respect to the value of a share of a minority shareholder.
The corporate control comprises the possibility of taking decisions about:
1. Election of the management;
2. Compensation schemes;
3. Business policies and practices;
4. Acquisitions or disposal of assets;
5. Selection of business partners;
6. Payment of dividends;
7. Financing policy;
8. Etc.
                                                          
3 If the investor had perfect information about the future cashflows, there would be nothing left to learn, which makes the waiting option
completely valueless.5
Pratt, Reilly and Schweihs (1995) quote premiums between 30 and 40% in transactions in the
United States in the '80 and '90s. More recently, the premiums have oscillated among these
figures, as we can see in the following graph.
Graph 1
  Source: Mergerstat
A similar pattern is observed in transactions in Europe, with premiums reaching in some cases
80% of the former price of the share.
Among the reasons cited to justify the size of the premium, we can mention the existence of
synergies between business, the access to valuable information and hence new business, and even
the possibility of changing the direction of business in favor of the acquirer.
These reasons may give rise to opportunities of doing new business (“calls”), and opportunities of
selling current business once in control (“puts”).
Even though there is no formal market of real options, the market where these "options" are trade
is the market for corporate control, which has been object of regulation to prevent fraud and
damages to minority shareholders.
2.1 The Tender Offer in Comparative Law
The comparative law brings in different systems, which ensure a fair treatment to minority
shareholders when an investor or entrepreneur wants to take control of a company
Among the systems devised to protect minority shareholders, we can identify two, with a third
one lying between in,
a. Obligatory Tender Offer.6
b. Voluntary Tender Offer.
c. Partially Obligatory Tender Offer.
The first one stems from the English law, later adopted in France, Belgium and Italy. It states that
everyone who wants to acquire a certain percentage of shares (which varies in different countries
but generally over a 30%), must make a tender offer for ALL the outstanding shares.
This system has been originated on the principle of equity for all shares, giving the possibility to
all the shareholders t liquidate their shares in case they want.
The voluntary tender offer is related with the American law. In the United States, the tender offer
is not the only method to gain control, given that control can be gained as well by direct
purchases of shares, or open market purchases. The protection to the minority shareholders comes
through the application of severe regulations of disclosure of information about the transaction
itself, and disclosure of the plans of the acquirer
In Spain there is an intermediate level, the Partially Obligatory Tender Offer, in which someone
seeking control of a firm can make a tender offer for a certain percentage of shares (generally less
than 100%), committing to purchase them at a specified price.
3. Analysis of the real options involved in the process of takeover r acquisition or corporate
control
So far we have developed the most relevant details about the origins of value stemming from
corporate control in terms of the decision associated to such a control.
Now we shall develop a simple model, which lets us identify the real options involved in a
process of acquisition, the relation between them and their relation to the control premium.
3.1 A Time Discrete Model with Discrete States of the Nature
Consider a neutral risk investor or entrepreneur assessing whether to invest Ic= I1 + I2 in the
corporate control of a firm
4. At t=0 she has an estimation of the possible value of the cashflows
and their probabilities associated, and based on this makes an estimation of the value Vi of the
firm.
                                                          
4 Defining control as the percentage of total capital needed according to different legal systems to undertake actions like those described in section
2.7
At t=1 there are two possible states of the nature, where the firm produces the cashflow Fh with
probability p and Fl with probability q = 1-p (where Fh>0 and Fl<0). The entrepreneur can invest
the full amount Ic at the beginning and gain access to control, or eventually invest a lower amount
I1 and decide later whether complete acquisition by investing I2 = Ic - I1 contingent on the state of
the nature.
In short, at t=0 the investor or entrepreneur must decide between:
(i)  invest I1 = Ic and gain control with an associated value equal to the discounted value of the
expected cashflows.
(ii)  invest I1 < Ic, wait to see how nature unfolds and act in turn;
At t=1 the true state of the nature is revealed with its associated cashflow Fi. This revelation can
be of two different sorts, public or private (which shall modify the results in terms of optimal
decisions). Facing this revelation, the entrepreneur has the opportunity of scaling up the
investment by a variable Ki that reflects the private added value of the control of the firm. This
variable K is at first imperfectly known by the entrepreneur (she does not perfectly know how
skillful she is in managing the firm's assets), and can adopt two possible values, Kh with
probability π and Kl with probability 1- π. This multiply of value stemming from control is
achieved by investing Ik.
We impose the restriction that all investments are sunk cost once made, and all that matters is the
realizations of F.
By simple inspection we can see that if the revealed cashflow is Fl, the investor does not choose
to invest in gaining control of the firm, and hence does not make follow up investment, because
should this happen, she would be multiplying her losses (measured by the variable K multiplying
the cashflow Fl <0). If this was the case, the optimal decision is to write off the loss I1, and
abandon the project. On the contrary, if the realized cashflow is Fh, then the investor must decide
whether to invest and get full control of the firm, and hence capture the growth option embedded.











where the net payoff associated to the project is:
Expected Net Present Value = - I1 + {Fi + Max [Fi - I2 + Max (E(Ki )* Fi/r - Ik, 0), 0]}/(1+r)
The maximum function allows us to eliminate all the negative payoffs, reflecting the flexibility
associated to the real options.
At t=2 every uncertainty is resolved, or there are no important decision to be taken with respect to
the original decision of gaining or not control, and the value of K is realized showing either a
profit or a loss
3.2 Solution
To find a solution we should state what would the behavior of the variable I2 (follow up
investment needed to gain control) be.
[1]9
It is clear that at t=0, the value of seizing control of the firm has to be consistent with its market
value (the extra value for the investor originated by scaling up investments and cashflows by the
variable KI is private and not realized yet for anyone), where
5:
V = I = E [F]/r = [p * Fh + q* Fl]/r
This means that if the investor wants to gain control at t=0, she should pay the current market
value of the controlling stake, Ic = I1= V
6. On the other hand, a lower participation (a no
controlling stake) would imply spending or investing less, I1 < Ic.
At t=1 there are two interesting situations related with the investment I2 needed to complete the
acquisition of the controlling stake. The reaction or level of this investment shall modify
substantially our results provided the assumptions made about the dynamics I2.
We shall treat two extreme cases and which are related with the reaction of I2 to the revelation of
the cashflow F at t=1. In the first case F is privately observed by the investor, hence the amount I2
to be invest at t=1 remains the same as what was expected to be paid at t=0 (I2 = Ic - I1). In the
second case, the realization of F is publicly observed, so the value of I2 is adjusted to reflect what
the market knows about Fi and hence makes more costly (or less if the realization is a bad state of
the nature) to gain control of the firm. For the sake of the analysis, we shall normalize Ic= 100%
Case 1. Value I2= Ic - I1
The problem to be solved is the maximization of [1] with respect to the control variable I1 subject
to the following restrictions:
I2 = Ic - I1
I1 ≥ 0
I2 ≥ 0
Solving the problem we obtain a corner solution where I1 = 0, I2 = 100%, which means that under
the conditions mentioned, the investor invests nothing in the first period, and waits for the
realization of the events in order to decide at t=1 whether is worth gaining control of the firm or
not. This result is intuitively correct, given that by following this strategy the investor avoids to
invest a dollar in the first stage and suffer a loss in the second stage if the state of the nature is
unfavorable (Fl < 0). The investor holds a waiting option, whose value stems from avoiding
having invested when the true state of the nature becomes the bad one, being this option value
                                                          
5 Assuming that once one of the two possible cashflows is revealed, remains the same forever.
[2]
[3]10
maximized by following the mentioned strategy. Every dollar the investor invests at t=0 in I1 has
an expected loss associated, with no real benefits in exchange (intuitively, the investor, when
facing the decision to invest at t=0 or at t=1, and  with no cost associated, will always prefer to
invest at t=1 with more information in hand), and with no change in the underlying value of the
opportunity. The present value of the expected loss avoided by the investor is given by:
q* Il /1+r
given that every dollar of investment is lost if the revealed state of the nature is L. The maximum
value of the waiting option will be given by the difference between the net expected value with
investment of I1= 0% (wait and maximize the value of the option) and I1= 100% (invest all at
once at t=1).
With I1= 0%
E[F] /(1+r) - I = p* {Fh - Ic + [E(K)* Fh/r - Ik]}/(1+r)
and with I1= 100%,
E[F]/(1+r) - I = {p* [Fh + [E(K)* Fh/r - Ik]] + q [Fl]}/(1+r) - Ic
where [6] minus [5] gives us the maximum value of the waiting option:
Waiting option = q* (Ic - Fl)/(1+r)
knowing that Fl < 0. The value of [7] provides the investor the maximum value attainable by
waiting to see the development of the events. In case the state of the nature is unfavorable, the
investor avoids having invested the full value I1=Ic which is consistent with [4] (the loss Fl does
not affect the position).
Case 2. Value I2= (Fh/r)*(Ic - I1)/Ic
This situation is intended to show the other extreme, where the value of the company (and hence
the controlling stake) fully reacts to the disclosure of the state of the nature. In this case the
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problem of the investor is to maximize [1] with respect to the control variable I1 subject to the
same restrictions and adding a new one given by:
I2= (Fh/r)*(Ic - I1)/Ic
The solution now of this problem is substantially different. In this case the investor must make a
trade off between the value associated to wait (avoiding a loss) associated to the control variable
I1 according to [4] :
q* Il /1+r
where each increment of I1 translate in an expected cost of :
q*∆I1 /1+r
and the extra value added coming from the savings in the exercise price of the growth option I2
according to [8]:
p*(Fh/r)*(1/Ic)*∆I1 /1+r
In the optimum, the amount to invest I1 is up to a point where the marginal cost of investing at
t=0 [7] (killing a waiting option) becomes equal to the marginal benefit [8] of saving on the
exercise price, with the following expression (where p= 1-q):
q / (1-q) = Fh/(r*Ic)
The right hand side term in [11] is in general greater than the left hand side term, given that
according to the market value at t=0 of Ic
Ic = E[F] = [(1-q)* Fh /r+ q * Fl/r] / 1+r
for high values of q, in equilibrium and to avoid Ic<0 (given that Fl<0) we need high value of Fh
and then:






Then, the maximum is obtained with I1 = 100%, I2=0, which means that the best strategy for the
investor seeking control is investing all at once at t=0, taking into consideration an any kind of
expected loss arising from bad states of the nature and killing the waiting option. The additional
restriction imposed implies that the market value of the remaining shares needed to gain control
is adjusted based on the revelation of the state of the nature, which in turns increases (in the
favorable state) the exercise price of the growth option and hence reduces its value. The investor
now cannot buy the remaining share needed for control at the former price I2 = Ic - I1, because
agents have adjusted their price based in the new information in the market. The private
information held by the investor is related only to the growth option (the own skills associated to
the management) but the information related to Fi is public. In general, the value of the growth
option is given by:
Growth option = Max (V - I2, 0)
where I2 is the investment needed to acquire the underlying asset of value V, whose value comes
from the expected value of K multiplied by the realized cashflow Fi, net of new investments Ik. If
the investor does not gain control at t=0, the exercise price of the growth option is increased in
the good state of the nature, making more costly for her to gain control and seize this option, and
hence reducing the value of the growth option.
3.3 Discussion
The results obtained are based on extreme cases. In both situations the information of the investor
associated to the growth option is private and unknown to the market (she knows the distribution
of the variable Ki which being a random variable can even give rise to the situation where the
realized benefits are not as bigger as expected at first), but the main difference between these two
cases is the reaction in the level of the variable I2 needed to gain control.
In the first case the revelation of the state of the nature and hence of Fi is private and seen only by
the investor, so the market does not react by increasing the price of the remaining shares of the
controlling stake. We could think that the investor sees a private signal which is highly or
perfectly correlated with Fi, which she was searching for and which lets her better infer the true
nature of her growth option. This signal, which could be based on better interpretation of private
information of the firm, is observed only by the investor, and allows her to handle a better
estimation of her growth option. It is because of this that the investor, in the optimum, does not
[13]13
invest any amount given that the signal is revealed to her anyway and for free, and providing this
strategy an expected value given by [3].
In the second case, the signal is of public access in the sense that is not only observable to the
investor, but also to the market as a whole, which in turn adjusts the estimation of price. As a
consequence, it becomes much more expensive for the investor to wait until the realization,
therefore (and given that the growth option is private) the investor prefers to gain control at t=0
instead of building control by sequential investments while observing the realization of events.
This action in turn implies killing partially or totally the waiting option and its associated value,
but saving the increase in the price of the controlling stake I2 if the state of the nature is favorable
and Fh is realized, keeping intact the value of the growth option. It is verified that the investor
shall prefer to kill the waiting option fearing that the public knowledge of the true state of the
nature will increase the cost I2 of gaining control of the firm at t=1. This fear and its related cost
overcome losing the investment if the state of the nature is unfavorable (recall that ex post the
amount invested is a sunk cost). What outweighs this loss is the high cost of acquiring control in
the second stage if the state of the nature is favorable.
Useless to say that none of these extremes cases is generally verified in reality; we always find an
intermediate point between these two extremes. Our model suggests that any internal solution
(I1>0, I2>0) will depend on the degree of reaction of I2 to the realization of F, where in our model
this reaction is given by the private or public nature of access to F. It is also true that the investor
has to construct necessarily a position I1 >0 (eliminating the extreme I1=0) to be in a position to
get access to any kind of sensitive information about the firm and its cashflows. The expected
sequence of a takeover or acquisition process may start by acquiring a minority stake (Ic > I1 >0)
which lets the investor "buy" information
7 about the true nature of the firm (even in a reduced
scale or imperfectly), and then a decision about acquiring control or not of the firm. As we could
observe in the sequence showed in figure 3, even in the case that information is privately
acquired and the state of the nature is favorable, the firm must also invest after an amount Ik, with
an uncertain Ki showing its true nature, which means that it could be completely rational to take
control of a firm to find next that the ability to exploit the growth option is not the one thought
before (being the realized ability K lower  or higher than expected, and hence the profits).
The extremes developed as cases 1 and 2 let us infer that the decision of gaining control of a firm
at a first stage (the amount to be spent initially) will be a function of the ability of the investor to
accurately estimate values. As long as this initial shareholding allows the investor to observe and
better process the true nature of events, she will always prefer to wait; as long as this ability is
public and shared with others becoming public (hence reflected in prices) the investor will gain
control in the first stage, killing the waiting option. This is perfectly rational, since when the
                                                          
7 "Buy" in the sense of acquiring a real option as in Dapena 2002.14
information becomes public, the exercise price of the controlling stake needed to access the
growth option (I2) will start to rise, reducing the value of such an option. In a sense it acts as a
dividends distribution in financial options, reducing the value of the call option on the stock; here
it increases the exercise price, and therefore a reduction in the premium to be paid. Both a
decrease on the current value of the underlying asset or an increase on the exercise price threaten
the value of the growth option.
In general terms, every agent holds an option to buy a firm. Even more, every one of us holds a
right to buy any asset. In the context of our model, it means that any investor derives value from
estimations of growth for the company. If this was the case, an option shared by all people is
worth nothing, in the sense of Dapena (2002). Therefore, the "property" of the growth option
embedded in the project will be stronger for those who build up minority shareholdings in the
targeted firm, which allow them to count with better information about the true nature of the firm.
3.4 A Numerical Simulation
Now we shall proceed with a numerical simulation intended to show the results of the
maximization problem in the simplest way given the value of some parameters. In the following
numerical simulation we can observe the value of the real options associated with a likely
corporate control of a firm.




p5 5 . 0 %




1 − π 50.0%
Ik 100.0
r5 . 0 %
which implies a value of the investment Ic equal to 100 at t=0, with values for Fh and  Fl and their
associated probabilities, a discount rate equal to r (risk free and the relevant in the economy given
our investor is risk neutral) and the multiplier variable Ki which can adopt one of two values with15






Kh*Fh/r - Ik 320
Kl*Fh/r-Ik 152
Fh/r 280
With these values, we can now run the optimization problem for each of the two cases analyzed.
In  case 1, where the realization of the state of the nature and its associated cashflow is privately
observed by the investor and the new information is not fully reflected in the price of the share,
the maximum value for the net present value of the investment in control al t=0 is:
VPN = 79.8
In the following table we can observe how the net and brute present values change when the
initial investment I1 changes
Table 4
I1 I2 E[F] E[F] - I1
0% 100% 79.8 79.8
5% 95% 82.6 77.6
10% 90% 85.3 75.3
15% 85% 88.1 73.1
20% 80% 90.8 70.8
25% 75% 93.6 68.6
30% 70% 96.3 66.3
40% 60% 101.8 61.8
50% 50% 107.3 57.3
60% 40% 112.8 52.8
70% 30% 118.3 48.3
Case 2 has the difference, the exercise price of the investment needed to gain access to control of
the firm I2 responds to the relevant state of the nature. In this case, both the investor and the
public as a whole have the ability to observe at a second stage the relevant state of the nature, and16
the price adjusts to reflect this new information. We mentioned that if this was the case, in the
favorable states of the nature the price of the share rises which makes more costly to gain control
of the company, increasing the exercise price I2 of the growth option and therefore reducing its
value.
The result is consistent with our previous findings, where I1= 100% with a net present value of:
VPN= 34.8
The investor forecasts the increase in the cost of the exercise price, which makes her increase her
investment in the first stage to avoid this cost. So in the extreme it becomes optimal for the
investor gain control and hence the growth option at t=0 by making I1= 100%, to avoid the  costs
associated with the increase in the exercise price I2 should  the favorable state of the nature
become true. With this strategy, the investor "kills" the waiting option whose value arises from
avoiding investments should the unfavorable state of the nature become true, but this costs is
more than compensated by the savings in I2 and the fully ownership of the growth option at the
original exercise price.
The following table shows us different combinations of I1 and I2 and the net present value
associated:
Table 5
I1 I2 E[F] E[F] - I1
100% 0% 134.8 34.8
95% 5% 127.1 32.1
90% 10% 119.4 29.4
85% 15% 111.7 26.7
80% 20% 104.0 24.0
75% 25% 96.3 21.3
70% 30% 88.6 18.6
60% 40% 73.2 13.2
50% 50% 57.8 7.8
40% 60% 42.4 2.4
30% 70% 27.0 -3.0
where we can observe how the net present value changes in response to different combinations of
amounts Ii invested.17
4. Conclusions
As we have developed in this paper, the value of the premium of control which is usually
associated in a direct way to the extra value an investor is willing to pay, can be seen as a real
option whose underlying asset is expected discount value of the cashflows associated to the set of
assets and resources belonging to the firm. This value is sensitive to the exercise price needed to
get access to the control of the firm.
Control over the assets and resources of a firm give the majority shareholder some sort of
discretionality on their best use. Corporate control has added value for an investor since it gives
her degrees of freedom about the use of assets, sources of finance, salaries, etc.
In most of the cases control arises from different categories of tender offer as we have seen in
section 2.
The acquisition process involves real options where the investor initially holds a waiting option
associated to the whole investment. This waiting option is common to all investor in the sense
that every one can invest at any time and at the right price. By purchasing minority shareholdings,
the investor tries to appropriate potential growth options. These growth options are private
opportunities for the investor, and their realizations are contingent on the true nature of the
cashflows in each state of the nature. There are some sort of minority shareholdings that allow the
investor to get access to better information and be in a better position to assess the real value of
the growth options associated to the assets of the firm, by doing some learning and taking full
advantage of the waiting option.
On the other hand, the control of the firm (and hence the growth option) has an exercise price
which may change according to the revelation of the state of the nature. A very important point
regarding the process off gaining control of a firm is given by the reaction of this exercise price to
the revelation of the state of the nature. As long as the exercise price does not react to the release
of information (the events and signals are privately observed), the investor is "almost" proprietary
of the option, because observes the events and decides whether to invest or not. This position lets
her avoid wasting money by investing and then having a bad state of the nature revealed. If, on
the other hand, the prices (or public perception of value of the firm) reacts to the state of the
nature revealed, the value of the remaining investment I2 or exercise price needed to gain full
control over the assets of the firm in the good state of the nature will increase, hence lowering the
value of the associated growth option (in a similar fashion to an unexpected distribution of
dividends in options like calls). Foreseeing this situation, the investor decides to save money and
get full control over the assets of the firm and hence over the growth option at t=0. This decision
"kills" the value of the waiting option, but the benefits may outweigh the costs associated to this
loss of value.18
The investment at the first stage I1 can also adopt different means, in the sense that getting a
participation in the capital of the firm it is not the only way to accomplish this. If, for example the
firm is private and there is no easy way to purchase minority shareholdings before making a
tender offer, the investor can invest in a similar but smaller firm to learn more about the market
and the true nature of the business environment, giving rise to better estimations of cashflows and
values associated
As we have mentioned, in most of the cases we shall find some sort of intermediate case (given
by I1>0, I2>0) between the two extremes developed and their corner solutions, where the exercise
price of the controlling stake and hence the growth option reacts to some extent but not in the
way described (so we can find some sort of mixed between private observation of events and
public observation); there will also be some legal aspects related to minimum or maximum
participation required to make a tender offer, and we shall also find a wider distribution of skills
and abilities to better acquire and process information and signals.
An extension of our work would be to collect information from the market about the sequence of
decisions about investments followed by investor when acquiring control of firms, the size of the
premium paid as an approximate to the value of the real options and the motives to exercise the
option at a particular time. It can also be observed the reaction of the value of the investment
needed to get control of the firm, and how it accelerates or not the decision of investing.19
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